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Every company takes risks daily, and every company
should be geared to run risks. It is the degree of
risk exposure and the sources of willingness to accept
chances that must be watched, says this author —

CORPORATE RISK POLICIES
by P. Bruce Buchan
Queen’s University
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sized manufacturing company went
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ods. Long after the difficulty had
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management were exceedingly re
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sota Mining and Eastman Kodak.
Earnings dropped sharply in the
ensuing years but not because of
the actions of either of these two
firms but rather a newcomer on
the scene, one with the strange
name “Xerox.” In short, the name
of the corporate game is “risk tak
ing.”
Companies should have an ex
plicit “risk policy” and it should
have the following characteristics:
1—It should be dynamic not
static.
2—It should differentiate between
levels of management.
3—It should differentiate between
functional areas.
4—It should be quantified as
much as possible.
5—It should be communicated
effectively to all in the corporation
and it should differentiate between
right and wrong outcomes.
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2—The impact on the morale,
enthusiasm, innovative spirit of
the employees.

EXHIBIT I

Very
High
Risk

It is important to avoid a policy
which does not change or which
will give the manager the opinion
that risks are something which are
beyond his control and/or just a
matter of luck.
Managers should not be risk-tak
ers but rather risk-makers. The
term “risk-taker” has a passive con
notation—it seems to imply that
the manager sits back and either
accepts or rejects proposals de
pending on the risk involved. This
infers he can do little to affect the
chances of success. Quite the con
trary, however, the major respon
sibility of the manager is not sim
ply to accept the risks but rather
to go out and influence them, to
endeavor to swing the odds in the
company’s favor.
This appears to be a source of
confusion among the critics of the
businessman (such as J. K. Gal
braith). They accuse managers of
being risk averters or risk mini
mizers. In fact, the manager is sim
ply endeavoring to improve the
chances of success—he launches a
promotion campaign in order to
improve the acceptability of a new
product. Is risk minimization the
same as success maximization? The
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corporate actions are the same, the
interpretation seems to depend on
whether one is “pro-” or “anti-”
business.
Managers should not accept risks
as a “given,” a static situation, but
rather a variable which has got to
be altered in the company’s favor.
Their primary function should be
to improve the chances of success.
Another dimension of the man
ager’s responsibility is to innovate,
to seek out new and better ways
of doing tasks. Change, deviations
from proven ways, always involve
elements of risk. These kinds of
risk should be taken, they just
don’t happen, they are caused by
aggressive, perceptive managers,
managers who, in effect, are riskmakers, rather than risk-takers!
Because the business environ
ment is continually changing as is
the particular circumstances of the
company, the company’s risk policy
should also change. Clearly, the
kinds of risks, which a company
can undertake are different when
it is struggling for survival, com
pared to when it is extremely prof
itable. In the former circumstances,
the philosophy should emphasize
the avoidance of ventures, (risks)
which might not succeed; in the
latter circumstances the philosophy
should stress the search for new
methods,
techniques,
products
which can lead to still higher prof
its. Note both philosophies are still
positive in that they both stress the
importance of success.
There are two factors to be con
sidered when determining the de
gree of risk you wish a manager
to assume:

1—The possible impact on the
survival of the company, and

Unfortunately, the higher one rises
in the organization the greater the
impact his actions will have on
both accounts. The key, then,
seems to be—how to encourage risk
taking on the part of the junior
(subordinate) managers while, at
the same time, not taking risks
which will imperil the company.
Too often, in avoiding the latter,
the senior manager is put in a
position of squelching the propos
als of the junior members.
Encouraging race horses early

This presents us with another
dichotomy. Can a manager, who is
inclined toward risk taking, (this
is probably a prerequisite for ad
vancement; as one senior manager
put it, “I would rather have race
horses which need restraining than
donkeys which need kicking”) be
come more conservative as he as
cends the managerial hierarchy?
It certainly seems possible. With
age, experience, and maturity there
seems to be a natural shift towards
a more conservative stance.
In order, therefore, to have a
vibrant, responsive, innovative or
ganization, the lower and middle
managers have got to be race
horses; they have to live in an en
vironment which encourages risk
taking and they have to have a
matching instinct for risk-taking.
Upper level managers, on the
other hand, should be more con
servative. Their perspective is that
of the total company. Their deci
sions are more significant in terms
of the potential impact on the eco
nomic health of the company.
Further, the time horizon of the
senior managers is usually much
longer than that of the junior. The
results of decisions made by top
management often are not seen for
several years after the decision,
whereas the results of decisions
made at lower levels can usually
be seen almost immediately. Be
cause of the greater degree of unManagement Adviser

Corporate risk policy should reflect a more conservative
profile at the upper executive level than at the lower.

certainty associated with events to
take place in the distant future,
decisions of that kind should be
more cautious.
According to a recent Fortune
article,1 senior managers are con
servative, as evidenced by one who
said:
“I would not bet the company
even if the prospects of the bet
were very good, ... I put a high
value on survival, the highest value.
It is almost human nature to be
conservative in this respect. In a
corporation you are trying to con
serve a critical mass.”
In a recently completed study for
The University of Michigan’s Bur
eau of Business Research an inde
pendent test found the senior man
agers of a large integrated oil cor
poration to be more conservative
than their juniors.
In summary, the corporation’s
policy should reflect a more con
servative profile at the upper level
than at the lower level, in keeping
with the magnitude of the financial
risks these men will ordinarily be
dealing with. However, the com
pany must be extremely careful to
see that this conservativeness is
not carried, as an example, down
into the lower reaches of the or
ganization. The risky proposals, the
bright ideas, have got to rise up
1—McDonald, John, “How the Man at
the Top Avoids Crises,” Fortune, Janu
ary, 1970.
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from the roots; if cut off at that
level, the plant is sure to wither
and die.
A manager is a manager, is a
manager, is a manager. Although
the accounting manager is often
vilified by both the marketing man
ager and the production manager
for being too conservative, it is
unlikely they would want him to
be any other way. In the best in
terest of the company, the accoun
tant should not eschew accuracy
and certainty for innovation and
uncertainty. On the other hand,
in the marketing area, risk, uncer
tainty, and innovation are the name
of the game. Clearly too, we would
want to match the person’s pro
clivity towards risk taking with the
degree of risk involved in the job.
Marketing people should be able
to live comfortably with uncer
tainty, so should the exploration
manager of an oil company. The
accountant, however, either by na
ture or training, or both, would
probably be quite uncomfortable
in that environment. Hence, the
company’s risk policy should rec
ognize the different degrees and
kinds of risks which exist in the
various functions.
One consensus of managers in
a petroleum firm ranked the risk
environment of the functional areas
as shown in Exhibit 1 on page 46.
The exploration department was
clearly seen to be in a major risk
area, i.e., there was a high degree

of uncertainty as to success. This
was followed by the marketing
department, but, interestingly, it
was seen to be considerably less
risky than the exploration opera
tions, and only somewhat above
“average risk.” Why? Being a large,
successful integrated oil company,
it was not felt that there was much
chance of failure, even in the mar
keting function. Sales continued to
grow steadily year after year with
no serious dips taking place.
The finance, personnel, and man
ufacturing functions were all con
sidered to be slightly below aver
age in risk proneness, while ac
counting was felt to be very low
in risk.
Within each of these areas, how
ever, it was possible to identify
varying degrees of risk. For exam
ple, in the finance area, the deci
sion regarding the granting of
credit is quite risky, while in per
sonnel the selection of new em
ployees is done in an atmosphere
of high uncertainty (selection tech
niques are notoriously unreliable).
In the other direction, it is unani
mously agreed that in certain areas
no risk whatsoever should be tol
erated; e.g., where the health and
safety of the employees are con
cerned.
Even in accounting, however, it
is not felt desirable to eliminate
all risks. Talking to a senior officer
of one company, he emphasized
that it was absolutely essential for
47

Find out what exists first, and then take steps to improve it if it’s not what you want . . .

his people to be constantly on the
lookout for new and better sys
tems:
“Don’t be hidebound by conven
tion. Look for new, better, more
meaningful ways of obtaining; pre
senting ‘information’ in its broad
est most meaningful sense.”
This reflects the changing atti
tudes of corporate accountants as
opposed to the external auditor
who is still strongly committed to
the established ways and also re
flects the nature of the conflict
which must become more and more
apparent as the emphasis swings
from that of providing financial
facts for the sole benefit of the
shareholders (and the tax collec
tor) to that of providing manage
ment with meaningful information
in order to make more effective
decisions.
It would be a good idea to carry
out an evaluation of the “risk atti
tudes” of the people who work for
you, in order to clarify what is the
nature of the risks involved in their
work. How do they see the risks
involved in other departments? A
format similar to that used to de
rive the information in Exhibit 1
would be useful. It is an open
ended type of question which per
mits the individual to discuss a
wide variety of risks (note it is
the discussion which emerges from
his selection which is particularly
important, the actual selection is
only useful as a general guide and
as a basis for comparing depart
ments, and/or functions).
Having clarified the different
perspectives between groups in the
company, this information can be
used to improve the understanding
between departments as to the real
nature of the kinds of uncertainties
which the various departments
face.
This will serve as an effective
basis for discussion. It gives the
48

employer (manager) a chance to
project his views and opinions.
This is what you primarily want.
Find out what exists first and then
take steps to improve it if the slant
is not as you desire. More directly,
it will help managers to pinpoint
the variation in risks which exist
within the department among the
various jobs, and lead to a better
understanding of the nature of the
risks and their causes.
Controllable risks

It is essential that the company
differentiate between those risks
which are within the control of the
department and those which are
outside. The latter may be due to
the actions of other departments
(which can then be clarified and
lines of communication laid down
which may help to minimize the
degree of the uncertainty) or may
be directly or indirectly due to
forces completely outside the com
pany. The latter can be classified
into two kinds, rational and nonrational. Rational forces are those
which result from a “rational” op
ponent. “Rational” is used quite
loosely here. The important aspect
is that it is the act of a “thinking”
individual or group such as your
competitors, the government, or
customers. You do have some lee
way (but, perhaps, very little), in
influencing their decisions or at
least in being able to anticipate
their actions. In contrast, the nonrational forces are “states of na
ture” which are completely unpre
dictable, such as hurricanes, floods,
snow storms, etc., about which you
can take no direct preventive ac
tions. Notice that the latter can be
protected against through insur
ance, but you can’t influence the
chances of such an event taking
place.
You now have a profile of the
risk environment within and be
tween departments. Its greatest

benefit is that it has given you and
all the members of your depart
ment a chance to clarify the kinds
of risks which have to be faced.
This in turn will help you to cope
with risk.
a. You will be less inclined to
wrongly accuse a man for making
an improper decision when the
outcome is not as desired.
b. You will be able to trace the
sources of the uncertainty and if
they are caused by “rational” forces
there is probably some course of
action at your disposal. If it is
caused by Nature, consult your
insurance company.
c. You will improve your em
ployees’ understanding of other de
partments and of the sources and
nature of the risks which you face.
With more enlightened “colleagues”
this should at least improve the
tolerance level, if not the sympathy
level, for your difficulties.
d. Being more aware of the
problems of others should enable
you to avoid aggravating the situ
ation or creating new difficulties.
Quantify the risk

This is a most difficult task, par
ticularly in the “behavioral” areas
of management decision making.
However, it is a good idea to de
velop a line of thought in which
you automatically ask yourself:
“What are the chances of success?”
Then try to put a figure on it such
as “one in ten” or “five in ten.”
Try to do something more than a
general assessment such as “very
good” or “fair.” This would be bet
ter than nothing, but you will be
able to make a better comparison
of alternatives if you have a spe
cific figure to refer to. Incidentally,
for those of you who practice man
agement by objectives, it is highly
desirable that you consider with
your employees the probability of
success in their various “objectives”
(usually it is inferred that the ob
Management Adviser

jectives will be reached with 100
per cent certainty). This will help
to overcome the problems of the
employees who are too ambitious,
and set themselves impossible tasks,
by getting them to think about the
obstacles which have to be over
come and to gauge the severity
of those obstacles. Similarly, for
those employees who set them
selves goals which have a 100 per
cent certainty of being achieved,
this may be a good opportunity to
explore their motivation, their self
confidence and your ability to tol
erate an objective which is not
reached. Are you creating the
proper atmosphere which encour
ages your employees to take on
new tasks, to attempt new meth
ods, or are you asking for only the
“sure thing”?

EXHIBIT 2A
RISK PAYOFF
and

RISK
(Chances
of Getting
Designated
Payoff)

Capital investment

Perhaps the most obvious area
for quantification of risk is in the
investment field. Most companies
do implicitly take into considera
tion the degree of risk associated
with capital investment proposals,
but in most cases there is room for
improvement, for making the risk
factor more explicit. Following is
a suggestion for accomplishing this.
You should consider these fac
tors in establishing the corpora
tions’ policy regarding investment:
a. Payoff—the rate of return
the company anticipates re
ceiving from the investment.
b. Risk—the chances that the
designated rate of return will
be realized.
c. Expected Rate of Return—
the minimum rate of return
the company is willing to ac
cept.
d. Investment—the amount of
capital required for the in
vestment proposal.

Exhibit 2A, on this page, shows
the combinations of risk and payoff
which will yield a specified “ex
pected rate of return,” (in this case
10 per cent). It is based on the
data shown in Exhibit 2B, above.
September-October, 1973

PAYOFF

(Rate of Return—Per Cent)

EXHIBIT 2B
EXPECTED
RATE OF RETURN
(l)x(2)

RISK
(Chances of
Getting
Designated
Payoff)
(1)

PAYOFF
(Return on
Investment)

(2)

(3)

100%
67
50

10%
15
20

10%
10
10

10

100

This shape of curve2 is rather
difficult to work with but when the
data is plotted on log-log paper
it becomes a more manageable
straight line. This has been done
in Exhibits 3, page 50, and 4, page
50.
If a company had as its policy
that it would accept any proposal
2—This is the familiar rectangular hyper
bola, YX = 10.

10

which would yield an “expected
return” of at least 10 per cent it
would accept any proposal which
was either on or above the 10 per
cent diagonal because anything
above, of course, would yield a
return greater than 10 per cent.
It would be unusual for a com
pany to have an investment policy
which did not vary with the amount
of capital required for the project.
49

EXHIBIT 3
RISK PAYOFF
and

RISK
(Chances
of Getting
Designated
Payoff)

PAYOFF
(Rate of Return—Per Cent)

EXHIBIT 4
RISK PAYOFF
EXPECTED RATE OF RETURN
and
LEVEL OF
INVESTMENT

RISK
(Chances
of Getting
Designated
Payoff)

$100,000

■ $ 10,000

PAYOFF
(Rate of Return—Per Cent)

50

Probably none do; however, it is
also likely that few have a welldefined policy which spells out the
differences between various sums.
For instance, Carl Spetzler3 found
that there was a wide variety of
opinions among the finance com
mittee members of a large petrol
eum company, as to what was an
appropriate return for different
amounts of investment. Eventually,
he was able to develop an “accept
able” explicit criteria for the cor
porate investment policy for sums
up to $300,000, but for larger
amounts, the company refused to
become pinned down.
Exhibit 4 shows how the corpor
ation can identify (spell out) its
criteria for varying amounts of in
vestment. To return briefly to an
earlier theme, this policy (criteria)
should be dynamic, not static. It
should change with changing cir
cumstances within the company,
and it should change as rapidly as
circumstances change. But, it should
be an explicit change which is com
municated quickly to those who
need to be advised. The format re
vealed in this exhibit will serve as
an excellent vehicle for finance
committees to arrive at and eval
uate their policies.
The values on the right of the
diagram indicate the size of the
capital investment being consid
ered. The horizontal line running
to the expected rate of return diag
onal shows the cut-off point below
which the proposals will not be
accepted. In this example, if there
is less than a 15 per cent chance of
making a 67 per cent return the
proposal will be rejected; anything
to the right of the diagonal and
above the horizontal line will be
accepted because the expected rate
of return will be greater than 10
per cent. Note that it is not neces
sary to stick to one “expected rate
of return” for all investments. It
may be appropriate to use a 10
per cent expected return for sums
3—Spetzler’s work arose out of a sugges
tion made by Ralph O. Swalm regarding
the need for a Corporate Utility Profile
(Harvard Business Review, Nov.-Dec.,
1966, pp. 123-136).
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between $1,000 and, say, $500,000
but then to revert to either a higher,
(say 15 per cent) or even lower
figure (say 6 per cent). In any
case, the finance committee should
spell out the basis or criteria for
the shift. These diagrams will be
most constructive in focusing the
committee’s attention on the rele
vant factors for consideration.
One gremlin you should guard
against is the “50-50” syndrome.
Our culture is imbued with the
concept that anything which has a
50-50 chance is “fair,” “just,” “equi
table.” Frequently this is carried
over in the decision-making process
and has a debilitating impact on
the decision. For instance, suppose
we had a “50-50” man applying the
company’s policy regarding the
aforementioned “10 per cent rate
of return.” His interpretation
would lead him to reject all pro
posals which had less than a 50-50
chance of success and to accept all
those which had a greater than 5050 chance. Thus, he would be
wrong in all those instances when
the odds were less than 50-50 but
the payoffs were greater than 20
per cent (i.e., were either on or
above the diagonal) and equally
wrong in accepting proposals when
the odds were greater than 50-50
but the payoffs were less than 20
per cent (i.e., below the diagonal).
This “fair,” 50-50 concept is so
pernicious that one has to be on
his guard against using it subcon
sciously in the decision-making
process.

Communicate your policy

Managers will respond to what
they believe the company’s risk
policy to be: Hence, it is what
they perceive which is important.
To this end it is essential that what
is perceived and that which “is,”
be one and the same.
A manager in a company was
released after one of his projects
proved to be a bust. This had a
traumatic effect on many other
managers. The company seemed to
be saying that if your proposals do
not succeed you will pay with your
September-October, 1973

When you have a "risk profile" of departments, you have
a chance to clarify the kinds of risks to be faced.

job. The net result was that the
managers were not particularly in
clined to undertake risky proposals
because, by definition, there was a
significant chance that they would
not be successful. The company’s
actions plus the grapevine, spread
a picture of the company’s policy
which would undoubtedly have an
inhibiting effect on the growth of
the company unless specific coun
ter measures were undertaken.
The company can avoid this
problem by being sure that its
policies are carried to the man
agers clearly by means other than
the grapevine. Consider the follow
ing lines of action:

• Give examples of risks taken
by managers which have been en
couraged and have paid off.
• Give examples of risks which
have been taken, have flopped, but
which have not impeded the pro
gress of the manager.
• Do reward risk taking, inno
vation, hard work, success through
promotions, pay increases, bonuses,
profit sharing schemes, and, most
importantly, verbal and written
recognition.

• Do NOT punish financial flops,
provided the cause was beyond the
control of the manager—if based
on the facts available at the time
of the decision it was a “good” de
cision (i.e., differentiate between
the right decision and the wrong
outcome).
• Do penalize shoddy, incom
petent, risk-averse managers. How
ever, do not go overboard, be posi
tive-concentrate on rewarding the
right decisions, rather than penal
izing those who make mistakes.
• Be suspicious of a manager
who has never had a “flop,” or at
least will never admit to one. It
might indicate he has never made
a risky decision or that he per
ceives an atmosphere which will
not tolerate risk taking.
Risks are an unavoidable part of
the businessman’s world. Without
them, there really wouldn’t be any
need for a businessman—a decision
maker. His job is to go out and
confront the risks: however, it
does pay him to think effectively
about the nature of the risks which
face him and his company and to
govern his actions accordingly.
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